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From December 15, 2005 to June 15, 2006, the watermarking community was challenged to remove the watermark from 3 diﬀerent
512× 512 watermarked images while maximizing the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) measured by comparing the watermarked
signals with their attacked counterparts. This challenge, which bore the inviting name of Break Our Watermarking System (BOWS),
had as its main objective to enlarge the current knowledge on attacks to watermarking systems. In this paper, the main results
obtained by the authors when attacking the BOWS system are presented and compared with strategies followed by other groups.
Essentially, two diﬀerent approaches have been followed: exhaustive search of the secret key and blind sensitivity attacks.
Copyright © 2007 P. Comesan˜a and F. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, with the spreading of the Internet as an
impressive communication tool and the appearance of ad-
vanced editing tools which can be used by almost any non-
trained user, the need of new technical solutions to the prob-
lems of copyright protection, authentication, fingerprinting,
or annotation of digital contents has soared. Digital water-
marking has been widely recognized as a potentially pow-
erful instrument against piracy, illegal modification, or im-
proper use of contents. Nevertheless, experience has shown
that the challenge of designing a watermarking method ro-
bust against an active attacker is extremely diﬃcult. Even
without considering geometrical attacks (which can be re-
garded as some of the most harmful attacks against wa-
termarking techniques), the range of strategies an attacker
could envisage to remove the watermark from a water-
marked content is virtually as diverse as the attackers them-
selves.
We believe that challenging the watermarking commu-
nity (and the public in general) to break a certain watermark-
ing system is valuable for a number of reasons: (1) the contest
serves to pinpoint the weaknesses of state-of-the-art meth-
ods, and likely, promote new research aimed at improving
those methods; (2) the inherent applicability of the attacks
serves as a benchmark to test results developed under more
theoretical conditions; (3) the existence of independent at-
tackers acts in a way as a “Monte Carlo” testing of the algo-
rithms.
The design of good (and new) attacks is one of the main
motivations of the Break Our Watermarking System (BOWS)
challenge. This contest consisted in removing the watermark
from three watermarked signals, trying to maximize the
peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), a squared error distortion
measure. (Remember that for 8-bits signals, PSNR(x, y) 
10 log 10[L·2552/‖x− y‖2], where L is the length of the com-
pared signals.) The fact of choosing a mean square error
(MSE) measure could be criticized, as it does not really re-
flect the impact of the attack on the semantics of the signal,
but the lack of a universally recognized perceptual distortion
measure also makes diﬃcult the choice of a non-MSE-based
measure. In addition, the use of an MSE measure is supposed
to leave out geometrical attacks for removing the watermark,
as the resulting MSE is typically believed to be quite high;
nevertheless, Andreas Westfeld showed in [1] that the wa-
termark can be removed using geometrical attacks (in that
case, rotation) achieving PSNRs as high as 28.94, 22.9, and
24.99 dBs, respectively. Geometrical attacks, whose percep-
tual impact may be quite reduced, are known to be extremely
harmful to the performance of most watermarking methods,
as they often cause a loss in the synchronization of the water-
mark.
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Given the interest of the organizers of BOWS in investi-
gating whether the knowledge of the watermarking scheme
could be useful for devising a better attacking strategy,
BOWS was divided into two diﬀerent stages: for the first
three months, just three 512× 512 watermarked images (see
Figure 1) and three binary detectors (one per image) were
provided; later, and for the next three months, the water-
marking method was made public. Moreover, at the very be-
ginning the number of calls to the detector per day was lim-
ited, trying to avoid oracle attacks.
Within this framework, we tried to remove the water-
mark from the provided images in two diﬀerent circum-
stances.
(1) The attacker completely lacks any knowledge of the
used watermarking method and only has access to a
detector, that he feeds with an image, and provides a
binary output. This situation corresponds to the first
stage of the BOWS challenge.
(2) The attacker knows all the details about the water-
marking scheme, except for a secret parameter, the se-
cret key, which is only shared by embedder and detec-
tor.
For the first case, we used the blind sensitivity attack pre-
viously published in [6], whereas for the second one, we fol-
lowed a strategy based on a exhaustive search on secret key
space.
Nevertheless, due to the large number of calls to the de-
tector that would be needed for performing a successful blind
sensitivity attack, we decided to attack the system in the re-
verse order of that assumed by the organization. Thus, we
first attacked BOWS trying to learn the secret key to later
perform the blind sensitivity attack. Such blindness implied
that information regarding the actual watermarking scheme,
such as the embedding domain, the used DCT coeﬃcients,
or the perceptual shaping of the watermark, was totally dis-
regarded. Our own objective here was to show the feasibility
of attacking a watermarking system without knowing any a
priori information about it. Needless to say, this assumption
could be considered as quite pessimistic for the attacker, for
most of this information could be actually learned by a smart
attacker, as it was practically shown by other participants in
the BOWS contest [10–12].
Detailed information on our two approaches to breaking
BOWS is given in Sections 2 and 3, respectively; approaches
followed by other groups are outlined in Section 4, and the
obtained results are compared in Section 5.
2. GUESSING THE SECRET KEY
Given that one of us was member of the steering commit-
tee, we did not directly participate in the contest. It is im-
portant to remark, however, that our knowledge about the
watermarking scheme was exactly the same as that publicly
available during the second stage of the contest: the used al-
gorithm was the well-known data-hiding method by Miller
et al. [2]. This means that we did not use any additional in-
formation on the algorithm implementation (including the
version number). Interestingly, other groups were able to get
access to the same details through their social engineering (or
coercive) strategies [12]. Miller et al.’s side-informed method
is based on the use of trellis codes for performing the source
and channel coding, being parameterized by some of the
properties of the used trellis (number of states and number
of arcs per state), as well as the spreading factor.
Still one open question for the attacker (and for us) was
to figure out how the original data-hiding scheme had been
adapted to this particular application, since Miller et al.’s al-
gorithm was intended to work in decoding (i.e., multiple
bit watermarking) scenarios instead of detection (i.e., one-
bit watermarking) ones. We thought that probably the most
straightforward way to carry out this adaptation would be to
compare the decoded message with a secret reference (which
is the actual embedded message); if they were identical, the
watermark could be said to be present in the received signal,
and absent otherwise. In order to test our conjecture on the
BOWS system available at [3] and decide if the three pro-
vided images were watermarked with both the same key and
the same reference message, we input those images to the de-
tectors corresponding to the other two images. As a result,
although very small PSNRs were obtained, the watermark
could still be detected, thus confirming our intuition. No-
tice that at this stage, the three available images were the only
inputs to the webpage detectors.
After the contest had started, we became aware of the ex-
istence of a new version of Miller et al.’s algorithm’s code [2],
publicly available at the webpage of one of the authors [4].
In this implementation, some values for the aforementioned
parameters are taken by default, in such a way that the de-
coder is only parameterized by the image to be checked z, the
secret key θ, and the length (in bytes) M of the message to
be decoded; this last point represents an additional diﬃculty
to the attackers’ task, as they must also consider the diﬀerent
choices for that parameter. Despite these obstacles, and with-
out certainly knowing if that was the version of the algorithm
used in BOWS, we decided to peruse this implementation
with the two-fold objective of better learning how it actually
worked, and performing a security attack (here meaning an
attack trying to gain knowledge about the chosen secret key).
Therefore, if we were able to find a pair (θ,M), such that
the outputs of the decoding function provided by the au-
thors of that trellis-based algorithm [2] were the same for
the three given images, we could be fairly confident that the
used secret key was θ, and that the algorithm implementa-
tion was the publicly available one [4]. Given that no a priori
information about the value of the secret key was available,
we decided to try the exhaustive search mechanism. Further-
more, we had to establish a range of possible values for M,
in order to try an exhaustive search for each possible value of
the secret key. Taking into account that the studied scheme
was really robust against most signal processing operations,
it was clear that its rate (i.e., the inverse of the number of
used coeﬃcients per embedded bit) should be small enough.
Considering that the number of coeﬃcients of the provided
images used by the algorithm for embedding information
is 12·512·512/64 = 49152, we decided that it was unlikely
that the number of hidden bits was larger than 200, that is,
M < 25 bytes, since otherwise the number of coeﬃcients per
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Figure 1: The three watermarked signals provided by the organization.
embedded bit should be smaller than 240, a choice which
would not aﬀord much robustness against conventional sig-
nal processing attacks. In view of these considerations, we
decided to implement the exhaustive search represented in
Figure 2. After 9 days of computation of a PERL script ver-
ifying if the decoded messages for diﬀerent secret keys and
message lengths were the same for all the three images, run
on a shared computer with 2 Intel Pentium Xeon processors
at 3.06 GHz and 2 GB RAM (be aware that the time require-
ment could be lightened if this process was paralleled), the
authors found a pair of values (θ,M) = (7168, 5) verifying
the condition introduced above, that is, the decoded message
for all the three images was the same (‘BOWS∗’).
Once the secrets of the system have been completely
learned, the attacker has to devise how this information can
be used to produce signals as close as possible to the pro-
vided watermarked ones, but where the watermark has been
removed, that is, where the decoded message is no longer
the reference one. The optimal way of doing so is to per-
form a search over the trellis looking for the boundary to the
codeword related to a message diﬀerent to the embedded one
(BOWS∗’) which is closer to the provided image. Partial re-
sults on this optimization were presented by Andreas West-
feld in the Security, Steganography and Watermarking of Mul-
timedia Contents IX Conference celebrated in January 2007
in San Jose (Calif, USA).1 In our case, we followed a sim-
pler but nonoptimal strategy: we watermarked the provided
signals with the same key θ, but with a diﬀerent message of
length M. In fact, taking into account the trellis nature of the
used code, we only changed the last bit of the reference mes-
sage to ‘BOWS+,’ assuming that in that way the distance be-
tween the originally embedded codeword and the newly ob-
tained one would be close to the minimum; this reasoning is
based on the trellis structure of the codebook. Nevertheless,
be aware that this strategy is not necessarily the optimal one,
due to both the heuristic nature of the embedding algorithm,
and the fact that there could be a codeword associated to a
message diﬀerent from BOWS+’ that is closer to the original
codeword. In any case, computing the new signal in the de-
scribed way, and considering the linear convex combinations
1 Andreas Westfeld obtained the secret key from the organizers after the two
stages of the contest ended.
of this signal and the provided one, we were able to produce
signals that were really close to the latter, but where the wa-
termark had been removed; this procedure is illustrated in
Figure 3. The PSNRs obtained for the three proposed images
are, respectively, 53.5051 dB, 56.1106 dB, and 56.9275 dB.
3. BLIND SENSITIVITY ATTACKS
Once both the secret key and the embedded message were
correctly guessed, we were able to perform in our local com-
puters as many calls to the detector as we wished, skipping
the initial constraint on the number of calls imposed by
BOWS rules, and circumventing the communication delays
with the server where the detectors were hosted.
As we previously mentioned, by performing the sensi-
tivity attack we tried to show that an attacker without any
knowledge of the watermarking scheme (not even any inten-
tion to gain such knowledge) would be able to obtain very
good results, by just applying a method already presented by
the authors in [6] and termed Blind Newton Sensitivity At-
tack (BNSA). For this reason, although this method could be
modified to reduce the number of calls to the detector [5],
we decided to use the basic version described in [6]. Further-
more, note that given that our algorithm assumes no prior
knowledge of the watermarking technique, it complies with
the rules established for the first stage of BOWS.
The chosen algorithm, which has shown to be eﬀective
against a wide range of watermarking methods, has the fol-
lowing characteristics that make it suitable for the BOWS
setup:
(i) it does not require any knowledge about the detection
function;
(ii) it just needs to know the binary output of the detection
function for a given input (not the actual value of the
detection function);
(iii) it can be highly paralleled, in such a way that sev-
eral attackers can work together, each of them using
a diﬀerent detector (or a set of them). In any case, be
aware that this characteristic could not be applied in
the BOWS setup, as only one detector was available;
(iv) a full iteration of the algorithm is not necessary for ob-
taining relatively good results.
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Figure 2: Block diagram of the exhaustive search of the secret key
approach. We checked 1 ≤ M ≤ 25 for increasing values of θ ∈





Figure 3: Diagram describing the generation of the attacked sig-
nal Z′ from the watermarked signal Y, and the signal Z obtained by
embedding a message diﬀerent of the reference one into the water-
marked content.
Furthermore, as we will explain later, it is not required to
compute exactly the Hessian matrix nor the gradient in order
to be able to produce a descent direction of the target func-
tion. In fact, we will show that some gradient components
are enough to obtain high-quality signals where the water-
mark is already removed. A basic block diagram of BNSA,
depicting its iterative nature, is plotted in Figure 5.
3.1. Blind Newton Sensitivity Attack





where dy(t) quantifies the distortion introduced by the at-
tacking vector t on the watermarked signal y, g(·) is the de-
tection function, and η is a threshold which determines the
detection region, in such a way that the detector will decide
that the watermark is present if and only if g(y) > η. Given
that in our problem the objective is to maximize the PSNR,
or equivalently to minimize the MSE of the distorting vector,
we can see that in this particular scenario dy(t) = ‖t‖2.
Therefore, the BNSA tries to iteratively solve this problem
by using a surjection hy, that projects the attacking vectors on
the decision boundary and should verify some specific char-
acteristics (see [6] for further information about these partic-
ulars), yielding an update of the algorithm with the generic
form
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∇̂(dy ◦hy)(sk) is the estimate of the gradient of (dy ◦hy)(sk),


















with δ > 0 an arbitrarily small positive number. This com-
putation requires also to estimate hy(·), which is not known
by the attacker. The proposed strategy is to use hy(s) = α∗·s,
where α∗ is a scaling factor computed using a bisection algo-
rithm.
Concerning the matrix B, diﬀerent possibilities can be
considered; probably the best choice would be to use an ap-
proximation of the Hessian, but due to computing limita-
tions, we have preferred to use B = IL×L, that is, the iden-
tity matrix of size L. For a small-enough ξk, this choice of
B guarantees a decrease of the target function as long as
(∇̂(dy ◦ hy)(sk))
T·∇(dy ◦ hy)(sk) > 0, where the last con-
dition is based on the Taylor series expansion of the objective
function. In order to verify this condition, the attacker does
not need to compute all the components of the estimate of
the gradient; instead it is enough to calculate a small num-
ber of them and set the remaining to 0. Obviously, better
results will be obtained when all the components are avail-
able, but the former strategy allows the attacker to stop the
algorithm whenever he has obtained a suboptimal solution
which yields a satisfactory (following his quality criterion)
attacked image; of course, adopting such strategy will reduce
the computational cost of his attack.
Finally, the computation of the step length [7, 8] of the
kth iteration ξk was performed following Armijo’s rule, due
to its simplicity.
3.2. Pseudocode
For the sake of clarity, next we give a pseudocode description
of the used implementation of the BNSA; this implementa-
tion slightly diﬀers with the later one presented in [9], and
that was debugged after close interaction with Prof. Barni’s
group in the University of Siena. In the following descrip-
tion we assume that the provided watermarked signal y is
arranged as a vector.
(1) Generate an i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random vector
t, with the same size as the watermarked signal y and
variance σ2T = 10−4.
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(2) Compute a scaling factor β such that y + β·t is on the
detection boundary. The squared Euclidean norm of
the vector β·t is denoted by γstart.
(3) For each component of the vector t,
(a) slightly modify the vector t, obtaining ti = t +
1·ei, where ei is the ith vector of the canonical
basis and 1= 10−3.
(b) compute a scaling factor β such that y +β·ti is on
the detection boundary. The squared Euclidean
norm of the vector β·ti is denoted by γi.
(4) Estimate the gradient of the squared Euclidean
norm of the vector necessary for obtaining a
nonwatermarked signal, when the vector t is consid-
ered. The ith component of the gradient is estimated
as ∇̂[i] = (γi − γstart)/1.
(5) Look for a step size providing a decrease in the objec-
tive function as follows
(a) ξ = 10.
(b) tnew = t− ξ·∇̂.
(c) Compute a scaling factor β such that y + β·tnew
is on the detection boundary. The squared Eu-
clidean norm of the vector β·tnew is denoted by
γafter.
(d) While γstart < γafter,
(i) ξ = 0.7·ξ;
(ii) tnew = t− ξ·∇̂;
(iii) Compute a scaling factor β such that y +
β·tnew is on the detection boundary. The
squared Euclidean norm of the vector β·tnew
is denoted by γafter.
(6) If the resulting signal y2 = y+β·tnew verifies the quality
criteria established by the attacker, then y2 is the solu-
tion. Otherwise, the algorithm is iterated again from
point 2 with t = tnew.
3.2.1. Computation of a scaling factor β such that y + β·t0
is on the detection boundary
(1) t = t0.
(2) If y + t is out of the detection region, then vout = t
and vin = 0. Otherwise, if y − t is out of the detection
region, then vout = −t and vin = 0.
(3) If both y + t and y − t are in the detection region,
(a) while both y + t and y − t are in the detection
region, t = 2·t.
(b) If y+t is out of the detection region, then vout = t
and vin = t/2. Otherwise, if y − t is out of the
detection region, then vout = −t and vin = −t/2.
(4) While ‖vout − vin‖ > 2(= 10−3),
(a) vmiddle = (vout + vin)/2.
(b) If y + vmiddle is in the detection region, then vin =
vmiddle; otherwise, vout = vmiddle.
(5) v = vout.
(6) The scaling factor β such that y + β·t0 is non-
watermarked is given by the ratio between the value
of any component of vectors v and t0, that is, β =
v[i]/t0[i], which is the same for any component.
3.3. Results
After one iteration of the BNSA performed in the pixel domain
of the three provided images, the PSNR obtained for the first
image is 56.3410 dB, for the second 56.9559 dB, and for the
third one is 58.1586 dB, and the resulting images are plotted
in Figure 6. Nevertheless, as pointed out by a reviewer, when
those images are captured from the document in pdf format
and the resulting image is fed to the detector, the watermark
is still present (in the tests we performed, this was the case
for images 1 and 3). Although the obtained result will obvi-
ously depend on the sequence of operations performed for
capturing the images (e.g., type of the file images inserted in
the paper, conversion of file types, etc.), the fact that we had
been able to reproduce these striking results obtained by the
reviewer led us to try to find a plausible explanation. In try-
ing to do this, we considered the energy of the three attack-
ing signals for each 8 × 8 block-DCT frequency, as well as
the ratio between the energy of the captured image and the
energy of the watermarked one for each frequency. In that
way we realized that whereas the power of the attacking sig-
nal is approximately constant for the frequencies considered
by the detector algorithm, the capturing process can be mod-
eled as low-pass. This is not rare, if one considers the small
size of the images in the paper, which made one suspicious
about the fact that the image could have undergone a process
of down-sampling and interpolation. Notice that this could
imply that the filtering undergone by the image is aﬀecting
more the attacking signal than the watermarked one.
This reasoning would also explain why this phenomenon
is not observed for the images attacked after the exhaustive
search of the secret key (Figure 4). In order to provide a fur-
ther argument supporting our hypothesis, we performed the
Wiener filtering of the three images attacked by BNSA, and
in all three cases, the watermark was recovered.
Furthermore, we think that is particularly interesting the
fact that acceptably good results are achieved even when a full
iteration of the BNSA is not completed. To illustrate, Figure 7
shows the PSNR achieved versus the number of actually com-
puted gradient components. One can see that the PSNR ob-
tained for 4096 computed coeﬃcients of the gradient is al-
ready larger than 40 dB for all the three images, meaning that
a quite reduced amount of computations would be required
for obtaining high-quality contents where the watermark is
removed. Furthermore, be aware that when the number of
considered gradient components is large enough (for val-
ues larger than approximately 2048), the PSNR grows almost
linearly with the number of components, meaning that the
reduction in the attacking distortion (in dB) grows linearly
with the logarithm of the number of available components
of the gradient.
Finally, although we have performed the BNSA in the
pixel domain, a smart attacker could suspect that the images
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Figure 5: Block diagram of the BNSA.
were not watermarked in all their frequency components, but
just in a subset of them, as most of the algorithms in the liter-
ature use that kind of strategy. Indeed, after performing some
tests, the attacker could realize that the watermark was only
embedded in 12 out of the 64 coeﬃcients of an 8 × 8 block-
DCT [10–12]. Using that information, the attacker could
speed up the attack more than 5 times, by just focusing on
estimating the gradient of those block DCT coeﬃcients that
he knows (or assumes) that they are being used by the water-
marking method. Even though we did not pursue this line,
we have determined the PSNR needed for removing the wa-
termark from the provided images using the attacking vec-
tors already computed with the BNSA in the spatial domain,
and setting to 0 those 52 8 × 8-DCT components which are
not used in each block. Remarkably, the results only show
a small improvement on the obtained PSNR, yielding val-
ues of 57.5496, 57.8056, and 60.0081 dB, respectively, indi-
cating that BNSA already succeeded in allocating almost all
the power in those DCT coeﬃcients that were really used,
even when it was performed in the pixel domain.
4. APPROACHES FOLLOWED BY OTHER GROUPS
In this section, we summarize the strategies followed by some
other groups involved in BOWS contest, discussing the sim-
ilarities and diﬀerences with our approach. The first three
strategies were applied during the first stage, whereas the
fourth one corresponds to the second stage, where the wa-
termarking algorithm was disclosed.
4.1. Le Guelvouit et al. [12]
In this paper, the authors claim to have used their social en-
gineering skills (very remarkable indeed) to learn the water-
marking scheme that was actually used. Once in possession
of such information, several attacks are explored as follows:
(i) using a diﬀerent version of the third image which was
previously published, they managed to remove the wa-
termark from that image with a PSNR of 37.35 dB;
(ii) a new attack, based on setting to zero some DCT
coeﬃcients and randomly shuﬄing other ones, was
proposed, yielding respective PSNRs of 30.39 dB,
31.21 dB, and 30.22 dB;
(iii) using an adaptation of a previous work [13] on data
hiding game theory, they compute the SAWGN (Scal-
ing and Additive White Gaussian Noise) attack min-
imizing the capacity of a spread spectrum-based sys-
tem, and apply it to the provided watermarked images
to remove the watermark. After taking into account the
perceptual considerations made in [2], they reached
respective PSNRs of 34.95 dB and 34.04 for the first
two images.
4.2. Earl [5]
Earl proposed a sensitivity analysis algorithm similar to that
in [6], with some modifications aimed at speeding-up con-
vergence. According to Earl, the main diﬀerences between
this new scheme and BNSA lie in
(i) how and when the surjection function is computed;
(ii) the approximate nature of the minimization;
(iii) the selection of a perceptually scaled basis on which to
search.
In fact, in view of the presented results, it seems that the per-
ceptual considerations have a major role in the reduction of
the number of calls to the detector needed by the proposed
method. Following this strategy, the author achieved respec-
tive PSNRs of around 38 dB, 35 dB, and 36 dB with a number
of detector calls slightly larger than 1500.
4.3. Craver et al. [11]
Craver et al. followed a diﬀerent approach for getting infor-
mation about the used watermarking scheme. They deter-
mined the frequency transform and the subbands by decreas-
ing the PSNR as much as possible while keeping the water-
mark still detectable. This information allowed them to de-
velop an attack which removes the watermark from the given
image by amplifying just a few AC coeﬃcients, obtaining an
average PSNR of 39.22 dB. An additional interesting concept
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Figure 6: The three signals obtained attacking the system with BNSA.
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Figure 7: PSNR obtained as a function of the number of computed
components of the gradient.
introduced by the authors is super-robustness, which they de-
fine as the property of a watermarking algorithm to survive se-
lect types of quality degradation far beyond what any reason-
able person would expect, constituting in fact a security weak-
ness.
4.4. Westfeld [1, 10]
Westfeld also managed to determine that the watermark was
embedded in 12 low-frequency coeﬃcients per block of 8×8
DCT. The author then developed a sensitivity attack and a
postprocessing step, which modifies the pixel values in the spa-
tial domain before they are rounded to integer levels of grey.
The impressive PSNRs obtained with this method are, re-
spectively, 60.74 dB, 57.05 dB, and 57.29 dB.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented two approaches for breaking
the watermarking scheme employed in the BOWS contest:
a key guessing attack and a sensitivity attack. Even though
both approaches lead to similar results, only the former re-
lies on certain a priori knowledge about the watermarking
system, while the latter is totally blind. This entails a much
larger computational load for the sensitivity-based attack.
An important remark is that complete key disclosure was
possible in this case due to its small length. This only ratifies
the well-known requirement of a large enough key space for
preventing exhaustive search attacks. In this sense, the size of
the space of the watermaked signal is not so important, as the
attacker can focus his attack on the usually smaller key space.
This is especially important, as the disclosure of the secret key
does not only allow to obtain signals where the watermark is
not detected with an excellent quality, but also allows the at-
tacker to generate falsely watermarked signals (also known as
forgeries) in all cases with almost no extra cost for successive
contents, as the attack needs to be performed once per secret
key (not per content).
Another important conclusion regarding the BNSA is
that it is possible to tradeoﬀ the final PSNR and the com-
putational load; this compromise is achieved by reducing the
number of gradient components that are actually computed.
Compared with the results obtained by other groups and
recorded in the BOWS webpage [3], we can see that the re-
sults achieved by our two attacks are only comparable with
those obtained by Westfeld [1] in the stage of the contest
where the watermarking method was publicly known. On
the first stage, when that method was still undisclosed, the
winner was the team led by Scott Craver, who achieved much
smaller PSNRs. These results clearly show the eﬀectiveness of
the proposed attacks for “black-box” detectors.
Finally, we would like to congratulate the organizers of
the BOWS contest, Drs. Barni and Piva, for the success of this
challenge. We definitely believe that these initiatives dramati-
cally contribute to the advancement of our discipline. Trying
to break BOWS was not only a lot of fun but also allowed us
to perfect our blind attack.
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